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Abstract 14 
 15 
A new EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) came into force on 1 January 2014. Article 15 of the new 16 
CFP basic regulation introduced a discard ban or landing obligation (LO) in EU fisheries whereby the 17 
discarding of quota species is prohibited. There is an urgent need to understand the impact of this 18 
new regulation on the UK fishing industry and fishing industries elsewhere in Europe. This study 19 
conducted a discard ban trial to provide an opportunity for the fishing industry to demonstrate what 20 
a LO would mean for them. The results are mostly illustrative and qualitative, designed to inform 21 
policy decisions and identify areas of future work to assist in the implementation of the discard ban. 22 
Five recommendations are made, which if adopted, would significantly improve the prospects of a 23 
smooth transition to a largely discard-free EU fishery. 24 
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1. Introduction 39 
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 40 
Article 15 of the new EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) basic regulation introduces a discard ban or 41 
landing obligation (LO) in EU fisheries whereby the discarding of quota species will be prohibited 42 
(European Parliament and Council Reg. No.1380/2013). Previously, market and regulatory forces 43 
motivated fishermen to discard their catches, whereby if the market was unfavourable catches 44 
would be returned to the sea, and if a vessel operator exhausted the quota for a species, they were 45 
legally required to discard any further catches of that species. But in the reformed CFP, the European 46 
Commission is seeking to reduce unwanted catches and eliminate discards, and quotas on total 47 
catch will place a direct cap on fishing mortality, requiring all catches (not just landings) to be 48 
deducted from the quota, and once the quota of a species is reached, fishing activities must stop. 49 
This represents a fundamental change in European fisheries policy as it switches the focus from the 50 
regulation of landings to the regulation of catches. All catches of pelagic and demersal species which 51 
have a quota will have to be landed (in the Mediterranean where there are no quotas, the discard 52 
ban will apply to all species with a minimum legal landing size). There are potential exceptions from 53 
the discard ban when these fish do not have to be landed , where the fish are prohibited for 54 
conservation reasons; or will be used for live bait; or have demonstrably high survival rates when 55 
discarded. Similarly, a small amount (de minimis) of up to 5% (after a transitional period of 4 years: 56 
up to 7% in years 1 and 2 of the discard ban and 6% in years 3 and 4 of the discard ban) of the total 57 
catch may be discarded if, either there are disproportionate costs of handling and storing the fish on 58 
board, or improving selectivity is proven to be difficult (European Commission 2013).  59 
 60 
The discard ban has been phased in from 1 January 2015, when it was applied to pelagic stocks, to 61 
be extended to cover all other regulated stocks between 2016 and 2019. Unwanted catches of 62 
species which are not subject to the LO can continue to be discarded. The aim of the LO is to make 63 
fishing more environmentally and economically sustainable as fishers change their methods to 64 
maximise the revenue from their quotas. The shift of focus from the regulation of landings to that of 65 
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total catches brings with it the expectation that, because the costs of catching unwanted fish will be 66 
internalised for fishing businesses, fishers will want to avoid catching low value fish and the most 67 
quotarestricted species. For instance, in order to maximize the revenue from the catch quotas, 68 
fishers will need to avoid catching fish that would result in a curtailment of their fishing season 69 
(referred to as ‘choke species’), and avoid catching undersized, and low-value fish, which would be 70 
deducted from their quota for little or no profit. The act of having to bring the catch to shore, the 71 
discard ban, is almost secondary, and was brought about through lobbying and public demand 72 
(Borges, 2015), but also due to the new requirement to monitor the full catch. Consequently, the 73 
latest reform of the CFP will lead to changes not only in fishing operations, but also in fish handling 74 
and marketing, as previously discarded catches are brought to shore.  75 
 76 
There is therefore a need to evaluate how the LO will impact on fishing vessels, fishing practices and 77 
the economic viability of fishing fleets. Several recent studies have focused on discard bans in 78 
anticipation of the implementation of the LO. For example, Condie et al. (2013) studied historic 79 
observer and log book data to assess the economic impact of a discard ban on the North Sea otter 80 
trawl fishery, and concluded that because vessel operators will be managed on their full catch (not 81 
just landings) they will have an incentive to operate more selectivity, whereas a discard ban, in 82 
isolation, generates little such incentive. Condie et al (2014b) reviewed the literature on discard bans 83 
in Alaska, British Columbia, New Zealand, the Faroe Islands, Norway, and Iceland, and stated that 84 
although discard bans can result in a reduction of discards, they depend on a substantial level of 85 
surveillance and/or economic incentives. To further support this, another desktop study of discards 86 
in the North Sea found that a discard ban in the North Sea for cod, haddock, saithe and herring could 87 
offer substantial benefits, but it was the use of real-time area closures, gear modifications, and 88 
electronic monitoring systems which would help ensure compliance and effectiveness (Diamond and 89 
Beukers-Stewart, 2011). 90 
 91 
5 
 
Ensuring access to existing quota will be critical to the successful implementation of the landing 92 
obligation (Poseidon, 2013), for example, the retrospective analysis of various fleet segments in the 93 
UK, showed the potential economic impact of choke species to be very substantial (Russell et al., 94 
2015). To help with the successful implementation of the LO, the regulation also includes the use of 95 
new flexibilities in quota management. These include interspecies and inter annual quota flexibility 96 
mechanisms (de Vos et al., 2016) or using alternative stock reference points (García et al., 2016). The 97 
importance of using these flexibilities has been demonstrated in simulations, for example, by 98 
offsetting catches of cod against saithe, negative economic impacts could be avoided in the North 99 
Sea trawl fishery (Simons et al., 2015). 100 
 101 
Unlike these desktop and modelling studies, the current study is a bespoke sea trial carried out in 102 
2012/2013 to evaluate the likely effects of the landing obligation in England, and was the first study 103 
of its kind in Europe. The objective of the work was to provide practical experience of a discard ban 104 
and use that to stimulate feedback from the participants to gain an insight into the direct practical, 105 
and also wider implications, for the fishing industry in implementing the LO. The importance of such 106 
trials was emphasised by one of the main regional stakeholder group, the North Sea Advisory 107 
Council (NSAC, 2013). The aim of this study was to provide practical recommendations for fisheries 108 
managers to support a successful implementation of the landing obligation. 109 
 110 
2. Method  111 
The trial focussed on how fishing practices, catch handling, storage and transport could change as a 112 
result of the obligation to land all catches, and it also reported on monitoring and data issues and 113 
direct economic aspects of the LO. It involved eight vessels of different sizes (four under-10m and 114 
four over-10m), gear types, from different ports along the south coast of England, for up to five 115 
months (Table 1). The English fishing fleet is made up of around 3,139 vessels, 83% are of length 116 
10m or less, 12% are of 15m or less, and the remainder are over 15m in length; of the largest vessels 117 
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there are around 26 English registered vessels 30-50m in length (MMO, 2016). This project was 118 
initiated in 2012 before the final details of the new CFP were agreed in 2013, so although the 119 
inclusion of a discard ban was anticipated, there was uncertainty around the exact details of the 120 
policy. The trial simulated a discard ban on all commercial species - defined as species for which 121 
some part of the catch is normally landed and sold – and so also included non-quota (unregulated) 122 
species. This differs from the final agreed LO which applies only to regulated species. These 123 
differences are accounted for in the reporting of this study. A total of 128 fishing trips were 124 
conducted during the trial, of which 40 had a scientific observer on board, equating to observer 125 
coverage of 31% for the trial. All fish caught were documented using the following methods. There 126 
was 100% scientific observer coverage for the under-10m vessels, and 10% observer coverage for 127 
the over-10m vessels owing to resources limitations. The observers weighed all the unwanted 128 
catches for the under-10m vessels at the point of landing. For the over-10m vessels, catches were 129 
not weighed either by skipper or observer;; instead observed weights were estimated by converting 130 
fish length measurements from the whole catch using length-weight relationships, while the 131 
skippers simply estimated the weight from experience. The skippers’ data were validated using the 132 
independent data from observed trips and data from a fishmeal plant, which received most of the 133 
otherwise discarded material. 134 
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Table 1 Details of the eight vessels participating in the discard ban trial along the south coast of England 135 
Vessel 
Vessel 
size Port of landing Gear Fishery 
ICES 
subarea 
Months 
fished 
Trips 
undertaken 
Trips 
observed 
1 11m Brixham 
Otter 
Trawl 
Mixed demersal fish (squid, 
lemon sole, cuttlefish) VIIe Dec-Apr 38 3 
2 15m Brixham 
Otter 
Trawl 
Mixed demersal fish (squid, 
lemon sole, cuttlefish) VIIe Dec-Mar 41 3 
3 23m 
Newlyn, Brixham, Plymouth, 
Exmouth, Roscoff Gill net 
Mixed demersal fish (hake, 
turbot) VIIe,f,g,h,j,k Nov-Mar 9 2 
4 24m Plymouth 
Beam 
trawl 
Mixed demersal (sole, 
monkfish, cuttlefish) VIIe,h Nov-Feb 10 2 
5-8 <10m Hastings Gill net 
Mixed demseral fish (sole, 
plaice, rays, cod) VIId Feb-Mar 30 30 
 136 
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Skippers of participating vessels had to land all the commercial species they would normally discard, 137 
either due to an absence of quota, the fish being below the legal minimum landing size (MLS), or 138 
because the skippers thought it was not marketable. The new CFP regulations have replaced MLS 139 
with minimum conservation reference sizes (MCRS), below which, fish must be landed but not made 140 
available for direct human consumption markets. Any prohibited species or zero TAC species could 141 
not be landed in the trial and were recorded before being released. For each trip, skippers of over-142 
10m vessels recorded the catch destined for the direct human consumption market, for the non-143 
human consumption market, the reasons for otherwise discarding these catches, and the 144 
destination of this material. 145 
 146 
Regarding the disposal of the unwanted catch, it was a condition of the trial that there was 147 
somewhere for it to be received when landed. The most suitable option was to send the material to 148 
the United Fish Industries (UFI) plant at Grimsby, UK, to be converted into fishmeal. This provided a 149 
guaranteed outlet for the discarded material. All quota species which were either under the legal 150 
size or for which there was insufficient quota to land, had to be processed into fishmeal. Although 151 
some other outlets were used for non-quota species, most of the otherwise discarded catches were 152 
sent for fishmeal. In reality, the industry will be able to access a range of non-human consumption 153 
markets to maximise profits from the previously discarded catch. The vessel owners received 154 
payment for material sent to UFI -  participating vessel owners had to specify what material was 155 
being sent and where it came from, and verified that the material was suitable for use as fishmeal. 156 
This evidence is required by FEMAS (Feed Materials Assurance Scheme) to demonstrate that the 157 
material is safe to use as animal feed. Transport of the material from the ports to Grimsby was also 158 
arranged before the trial started, and was paid for by the project.  159 
 160 
At the end of the trial, the perceptions and experiences of the participants were gathered from all 161 
skippers, market managers and managers from UFI. These discussions were based on questionnaires 162 
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with open-ended questions. One researcher conducted face-to-face interviews; the under-10m 163 
skippers were interviewed as a group. Questions were tailored to the role of the participants but 164 
included the three key broad questions (Table 2). Each interview began with a description of the 165 
proposed discard ban policy, the project objectives and a presentation of the data generated from 166 
the project. The interviews were transcribed;  coded-based themes and concepts were drawn from 167 
them; and then a summary text of this information was produced. 168 
Table 2 Key questions and details asked of the trial participants 169 
1. How representative of normal fishing practice was the trial period? 
Topics covered: Were catch and discard patterns normal: including main species discarded, 
reasons for discarding, sorting practice, restrictions on landings such as zero TACs? Were any 
operational changes introduced during the trial: including anything to modify or avoid 
unwanted catches (area or gear changes), buy/lease additional quota, sell material on the 
human consumption or non-human consumption markets that would not otherwise have 
been sold? 
2. What were the logistical and operational implications of the discard ban, including costs? 
Topics covered: How was the practical activity of your business altered? How were the fish 
handled, stored, and transported on shore? What was the impact on vessel/crew/staff of 
storing additional material? What happened when the otherwise discarded material was 
landed? What were the economic costs of handling the additional material? Were there 
safety concerns? Was it manageable? 
3. What is your view on the new policy, for your business and wider implications? 
Topics covered: What will your business need to do to adapt to the discard ban? What will 
other vessels need to change? What are the economic implications and main risks to your 
business and to the wider fleet? What are the main challenges to successfully implement a 
discard ban? What must be in place to make the policy work? What could be the benefits of 
the policy? 
 170 
3. Results 171 
Data validation 172 
For the under 10m vessels, the observer-calculated weights closely matched the actual weight 173 
measurements at the point of landing (R-square 0.89; slope 0.95, linear regression), providing 174 
confidence in the length-weight relationship method to estimate weights. The results from the over-175 
10m vessels indicate there was a trend for the skippers’ estimates of unwanted catches to be slightly 176 
lower than the observers’, but overall, there was considered sufficiently close correlation between 177 
the estimates (R-squared 0.85; slope 0.78) to enable the use of the skippers’ data in a broader 178 
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analysis. This was reaffirmed using independent data from the fishmeal plant which recorded 179 
weights of all material received. This recording mechanism at the point of delivery of the non-human 180 
consumption material provided a useful confirmation of the skippers’ reported landings. All the fish 181 
were believed to be documented, the timing of the fish arriving at the fish meal plant correlated 182 
closely to the landing of the otherwise discarded material (Figure 1), and there was a high level of 183 
confidence in the quantities and in the reported destination of those catches at first sale. 184 
 185 
Figure 1: Cumulative weight of landed unwanted catches received by United Fish Industries (solid 186 
line) and the difference between this, and the cumulative weight of unwanted catches landed and 187 
reported by skipper (dotted line). 188 
 189 
 190 
 191 
Discard data analysis 192 
During the trial, the total recorded weight of unwanted catches caught by all vessels was estimated 193 
to be 27,171 kg. Of this total quantity, 70% came ashore and was sent to the fish meal factory, and 194 
30% was released at sea. Of the catch released at sea, most (71%) could not be landed under the 195 
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conditions of the trial because the species had either a zero quota or was prohibited (mostly 196 
spurdog, undulate ray and common skate). The remainder of the catches were released because of a 197 
perceived high survivability by the skippers, and consisted of skates and ray species, and to a lesser 198 
extent conger eel, brill, turbot, and (Dover) sole. Of the unwanted catch that was landed for 199 
fishmeal, 68% was of quota species; Table 3 shows the total weight of each quota species landed 200 
during the trial and a breakdown of the reasons for otherwise discarding these fish, as given by the 201 
skipper. The remainder of the catch (32%) that went for fishmeal, was of non-quota species; most of 202 
which (95%) was bib, dab, dogfish and gurnards. 203 
 204 
Species % 
Damage  
% Quota 
Restricted 
% Below 
MLS 
% No Market Total (Kg) 
Cod 48 52 0 0 3642 
Dover Sole 1 1 98 0 68 
Haddock 30 70 0 0 372 
Herring 0 0 0 100 3 
Hake 92 0 2 6 497 
Horse Mackerel 0 0 0 100 65 
Ling 100 0 0 0 792 
Mackerel 0 0 1 99 41 
Megrim 0 100 0 0 72 
Monkfish 100 0 0 0 414 
Plaice 0 41 43 16 3043 
Pollack 100 0 0 0 723 
Saithe 96 0 0 4 112 
Skates and Rays 0 80 0 20 201 
Whiting 4 11 13 72 2407 
Total 35 30 14 21 12453 
Table 3. Total weight of unwanted quota species and % contribution for each reason given for 205 
discarding 206 
 207 
Overall, most monkfish, hake, ling, pollack and saithe that would have been discarded were 208 
unwanted because they were damaged (mostly by seals when caught in gill nets). The unwanted 209 
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herring and horse mackerel and most the mackerel were over the MLS but would have been 210 
discarded because they were not of marketable size; some of the unwanted plaice and whiting was 211 
also of unmarketable size, although above the MLS. Overall, 12,453 kg of species regulated by 212 
quotas and therefore subject to the LO (Table 3), were landed in this trial but would have otherwise 213 
been discarded, equating to 97 kg per trip (128 trips). When excluding fish discarded due to quota 214 
restrictions, which will not occur under the LO, this gives 68 kg per trip. Some of this catch was 215 
discarded due to market forces, and therefore could go to the human consumption market, or it was 216 
damaged and would not need to be landed, leaving only 13 kg of the total 212 kg of unwanted catch 217 
per average trip, which would have to be sold to a non-human consumption market. The total 218 
weight of unwanted catches that were not of quota species, was 14,764 kg, equating to 115 kg per 219 
trip and under the LO, there is no requirement to land these unwanted catches. The values 220 
presented here are not considered representative of the fleet but provide indicative values for the 221 
participating vessels. The results demonstrate that a substantial quantity of unwanted catches will 222 
continue to be returned to the sea under the Landing Obligation, however, anticipated changes in 223 
fishing behaviour and gear selectivity would likely reduce all unwanted catches. 224 
 225 
Cost of landing otherwise discarded catches 226 
The costs associated with bringing the otherwise discarded catches ashore was calculated at £280 227 
per tonne (this included box rental and storage on market, box loading, forklift operation, 228 
refrigeration, pallet charge, ice, and transport). The total revenue of the material received by UFI 229 
had a value of £2,640, which meant the otherwise discarded catches were sold at a loss of £2,690 or 230 
£122 per tonne. 231 
 232 
The main themes and concepts derived from the interviews are presented for each key question: 233 
How representative of normal fishing practice was the trial period? 234 
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The catches taken during the trial were considered by participating skippers to be representative of 235 
the period of the trial. Skippers stated that the gears that they used, and locations fished, were the 236 
same as usual and no change was made to their quota holdings. They did state that discard patterns 237 
can vary seasonally and under different levels of quota restriction and so results will have differed 238 
had the timing of the trial been different. In total, fifteen species with quotas, and also skates and 239 
rays collectively, were discarded and skippers said that the quotas for cod, plaice, haddock, and 240 
Dover sole were the most likely to be exhausted first, and so could ‘choke’ their fisheries. Skippers 241 
stated they do not target these species, so  these catches are incidental, but  only small catches 242 
could exhaust their limited quota and prevent them from fishing. The extreme example mentioned 243 
of this was for species with a zero quota, for which, under the regulation, catching a single fish could 244 
close a fishery. Undulate ray and Spurdog were the species for which this issue was most important 245 
for the participating vessels. 246 
 247 
What were the logistical and operational implications of the discard ban, including costs? 248 
Interviewees identified potential economic costs and charges associated with sorting, landing and 249 
transporting the otherwise discarded fish, including: 250 
 losses associated with foregone catches after cessation of fishing due to exhausting quotas 251 
(choke species); 252 
 losses associated with counting undersized fish (<MCRS) against quota that could otherwise 253 
be used to land fish on to the human consumption market; 254 
  and losses associated with reduced catches of non-limited (underutilised) quota and non-255 
quota species when changes to the gear was made to avoid quota- limited species. 256 
Some direct economic benefits were also identified, including those for transport companies and 257 
storage companies that will handle the previously discarded catches; and gains from selling 258 
previously discarded fish on the human and non-human consumption markets. 259 
 260 
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Participating skippers said sorting the catch would take more time and may reduce fishing time. 261 
Health and safety implications were also highlighted, with additional sorting and moving of the 262 
catch, increased exposure of the crew to adverse weather conditions and more material stored on 263 
deck and in the fish hold. The smaller vessels on the trial were particularly restricted for space on the 264 
deck: for example, the under-10m vessels in the trial could carry only six or seven fish boxes. 265 
Similarly, it was stated that hold capacity will be a limiting factor for some larger vessels, which may 266 
have to complete more landing events to offload catches before they can continue fishing. 267 
 268 
The trial also highlighted the risk of inadequate preparations made to receive previously discarded 269 
material at the port. The logistical organisation to receive and transport material, was done by the 270 
project team, and would otherwise not have been in place. The need to land additional boxes of fish 271 
may cause congestion at the ports, with longer periods spent queuing by vessels to land their 272 
catches. At the market auctions, the material must be moved to a storage facility, requiring staff, 273 
forklift trucks and additional refrigeration units and areas for storage bins. Material not destined for 274 
direct human consumption will need to be stored separately and physical space may not be 275 
available. With small fish coming ashore there was also a recognised risk that these could enter the 276 
human food chain. 277 
 278 
What is your view on the new policy, for your business and wider implications? 279 
All skippers in this trial believed the landing obligation will be extremely difficult to enforce. Vessel 280 
operators and market managers stated there was little incentive for skippers to bring unwanted 281 
material ashore. Not only will those catches be deducted from the catch quota and so reduce the 282 
quota available for the rest of the year, but the vessels will receive little economic return for the 283 
material or even make a loss when paying for disposal. Participants said the requirement to land fish  284 
that might otherwise survive if returned to the sea, would also discourage compliance with the LO. 285 
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One skipper said that if vessels arrived at the port with some undersized fish, no one would know 286 
whether that comprised all the unwanted catch. 287 
 288 
Three skippers stated that having cameras on board was the only approach that would ensure 289 
compliance with the discard ban: other skippers were supportive of cameras in principle, but with 290 
reservations. It was believed unlikely that all vessels would have cameras on board, and one 291 
suggestion was for only larger vessels, those with the highest catching capability, to have cameras. 292 
Also, there was a generally low level of confidence that other EU Member States would adequately 293 
enforce regulations, and a fear that UK-vessel operators would be disadvantaged relative to those 294 
from other countries. 295 
 296 
Beyond the direct economic costs described above, interviewees described other potential 297 
economic consequences. These included the benefits from avoiding quota limited and undersized 298 
fish, which would ultimately translate into increased stock size and quotas; and the gains from 299 
maximising revenues from adjusted quotas that will now include previously discarded catches. These 300 
are sometimes referred to as quota uplifts, and reflect the transition from landings quotas to catch 301 
quotas and are based on the level of discarding that was occurring but which was not previously not 302 
allocated as part of the quota. . These upward quota adjustments are based on independent discard 303 
estimates from scientific observer programmes. 304 
 305 
However, participating skippers perceived a risk that the estimated discards were less than the 306 
reality. This would mean the quotas, when adjusted to include estimated discard levels, would not 307 
be sufficient to cover all the actual discards. and the fleet would need to avoid catching more fish to 308 
avoid a choke situation or to benefit from the additional quota. Some participating skippers claimed 309 
that discard data deficiencies were the highest risk in the transition to the LO, and insufficient uplift 310 
in quota could stop vessels from fishing. 311 
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 312 
Statements specifically from market managers made clear that they did not want any additional 313 
burden of handling or recording non-human consumption material, because any profits for this 314 
material are marginal at best. They also did not want to risk any deterioration in the quality of the 315 
fish going into the human consumption market, and would consider small unwanted fish entering 316 
the market as a negative impact on their business. 317 
 318 
4. Discussion 319 
The discard ban trial was not an exact simulation of the LO: the trial simulated a discard ban on all 320 
commercial species, which differs from the final agreed LO, in which only quota species are affected. 321 
Therefore, more species and more otherwise discarded material were landed than is required under 322 
the LO. However, this does not detract from the study because it was never the intention to use data 323 
to forecast levels of unwanted catches coming ashore, but rather to identify key issues surrounding 324 
the operational, monitoring and direct economic aspects of this change in policy. Furthermore, in 325 
this trial all otherwise discarded quota species had to be utilised as fishmeal, however, with the 326 
implementation of the discard ban, other outlets for the material are likely to be utilised (Mangi and 327 
Catchpole, 2014), either generating a profit or reducing the losses incurred. 328 
 329 
The discard ban trial has provided the following six lessons about how the LO would affect the 330 
fishing industry: 331 
1) There are reasons to be optimistic about the economic impact of the LO.  332 
2) Issues of data inadequacy must be overcome.  333 
3) Enforcement of the landings obligation will require new modes of management. 334 
4) The problem of quota inflexibility must be resolved. 335 
5) Dealing with the unwanted catch at sea and on land raises several logistical issues. 336 
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6) A cultural shift in mind-set is needed from the vessel operators to enable the LO to deliver 337 
more sustainable fisheries.  338 
 339 
First, reasons to be optimistic about the economic impact of the LO: On the likely economic impacts 340 
of the discard ban, they can be broadly categorised into potential losses and potential gains. The 341 
study identified the potential losses include the following: losses associated with sorting, landing, 342 
and transporting otherwise discarded fish; foregone catches due to exhausting quotas; counting 343 
undersized fish (<MCRS) against quota; and reduced catches of marketable fish when using fishing 344 
methods to avoid quota limited species. The potential gains include those for non-human 345 
consumption outlets that can utilise and profit from previously discarded catches (Mangi & 346 
Catchpole 2014: 299; de Rozarieux 2015: 13); gains from avoiding unwanted fish, which translate 347 
into increased stock size and quotas; gains from maximising revenues from quota uplifts; gains for 348 
transport companies and storage companies that will handle the previously discarded catches; and 349 
gains associated with selling otherwise discarded fish on to the human and non-human consumption 350 
markets. The discard ban trial provides cautious grounds for optimism that the potential gains of the 351 
LO would eventually outweigh the potential losses.  352 
 353 
The estimated loss of £122 per tonne when landing previously discarded catches assumes the 354 
participating vessels were representative of the wider fleet. This is likely a maximum, for the 355 
following reasons: 1. The ports selected were some of the furthest away from a fishmeal plant, 356 
therefore transport costs would be lower from other ports. 2. The quantities being transported did 357 
not allow for the most efficient use of lorries, since storage bins being moved were less than full - 358 
companies could collect and store material until sufficient quantity has been accumulated to make 359 
transport viable. 3. The scale of the trial was too small to allow for the most efficient use of catch 360 
handling services. Because it was a trial, one-off costs were paid to markets to deal with the 361 
material, which were higher than would be expected following implementation. 4. The previously 362 
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discarded catches do have a financial value and it is likely that improved efficiency in handling and 363 
transport, and increased competition for the material, would evolve and improve returns to the 364 
vessel operators. 365 
 366 
There is, however, uncertainty over how much additional material destined for human and non-367 
human consumption might come ashore, because the extent to which vessel operators can adapt 368 
fishing methods and alter their catch compositions is not known. Moreover, with the potential for 369 
various exemptions, it is difficult to predict the levels of material and therefore the level of 370 
infrastructure investment and preparedness required (transport, storage bins, physical space, 371 
freezers, cold stores, and fishmeal processing plants). Moreover, small but legally-sized fish, which 372 
would have previously been discarded (high-graded), will be landed for human consumption as a 373 
first preference under the landing obligation, so more of it may appear on the market. However, 374 
there is no indication from this study that vessel operators will be motivated to target fish below the 375 
MCRS, owing to the large price differential between the human and non-human consumption 376 
markets.  377 
 378 
The potential gain to the fishing industry from the LO is mostly associated with the adjustment in 379 
quota, whereby catches previously discarded will be included in the quota whereas before they were 380 
not. Therefore, there is potential for vessel operators to convert this additional quota into 381 
marketable landings for the human consumption market. Taking this into account, the LO affords 382 
sufficient opportunities for entrepreneurial fishers to deal with some of its challenges, and a key 383 
determinant of the economic effect will be how the adjustments to quota are allocated to the fleets 384 
at a national and international level, and the ability to access unused quota. 385 
 386 
Second, there are serious data challenges that must be overcome for the landing obligation to be 387 
successfully implemented. The quota setting and ability to achieve fish stock status objectives is 388 
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dependent on collecting accurate data on catches. In this trial, new log sheets were devised for the 389 
skippers to record all components of the catch, observer coverage was increased beyond normal 390 
practice, and the fishmeal plant provided a third source of data. These steps provided validated 391 
estimates and high confidence in the catches from the participating vessels, but this is not normal 392 
practice. 393 
 394 
It is recognised that commercial catch data may be inaccurate, because of inaccuracies in skippers’ 395 
reporting but also in estimates of discards which are based on scientific observations made on a 396 
relatively few fishing trips; and while skippers are required to record discard amounts, these data are 397 
not considered sufficiently accurate to be applied (STECF, 2013). In the implementation of the LO, 398 
the level of actual discards may therefore be different from estimated levels. If the actual levels of 399 
discards are higher than the estimated levels, the fleet will need to avoid more of the previously 400 
discarded fish to prevent an economic impact. If the actual levels of discards are lower than 401 
estimated, the fleet can simply convert the quota uplift to saleable fish through more fishing effort. 402 
Moreover, the effect on the individual vessel operator will be dependent not only on the level of 403 
discrepancy between estimated and actual discard rates for the vessel, but also the distribution of 404 
the quota across the fleet. 405 
 406 
The expectation of the LO is for changes in selectivity by vessel operators.  However, any differences 407 
in reported levels of unwanted catches when the LO takes effect, compared with the current 408 
estimates, could be due to, either poor estimation of these catches before implementation; or to 409 
low compliance with the LO; or to changes in selectivity; or to changes to the stock structure and 410 
composition of catches. To enable accurate assessment of the status of the stocks, it will be essential 411 
to know which of these factors are operating. One of the anticipated benefits of the reformed CFP is 412 
the improved catch data, however there is currently no agreed approach on how catch monitoring 413 
will be achieved. The LO will necessitate changes in data collection and data use; there is a risk that if 414 
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the quality of the data on catches after the implementation of the LO deteriorates, then the quality 415 
of the stock assessments and the confidence in the quota advice will be reduced. 416 
 417 
In the UK, monitoring of total catches is easier for over-10m vessels than for under-10m vessels, 418 
because the over-10m vessel e-log system can record all components of the catch. In this trial, over-419 
10m vessel catches were recorded using the existing prior-to-landing notification and e-log books; 420 
but because some technical problems were encountered, we recommend that robust testing of the 421 
system is done so skippers can have the tools to record their full catch. For the UK under-10m sector, 422 
recording full catches was a challenge. Currently, no prior-notification of landing or the use of log 423 
sheets is required. Skippers stated it was logistically difficult to produced catch data at sea, and with 424 
vessels working close inshore, it was not practical to give prior notification of landing. It is 425 
recommended that work be undertaken to determine how new self-reporting tools, independent at-426 
sea observations, and registered sales data can be integrated to deliver data on the full catch taken 427 
by vessels where electronic reporting is not currently required.  428 
 429 
Third, enforcement of the landings obligation will require new modes of management: Data 430 
collection to drive stock assessments is directly linked with compliance with quota restrictions. In 431 
this trial, the skippers participated voluntarily, there were no sanctions for not meeting the terms of 432 
the simulation, the data generated provided confidence in the reported catches, and so compliance 433 
was high. However, without adequate enforcement, the incentive framework to successfully deliver 434 
the LO will be absent (NSAC, 2013; STECF, 2013).  According to skippers in this trial, the landing 435 
obligation will be extremely difficult to enforce, because there is little incentive to bring ashore and 436 
record previously discarded catches. 437 
 438 
New methods are needed to monitor total catches, including remote electronic monitoring (REM) 439 
and validated self‐sampling schemes. Several studies have testified to the success of REM. For 440 
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example, McElderry (2014) reported positive results of electronic monitoring to enforce a discard 441 
ban on the US Pacific shore-based whiting fishery, while the MMO (2012; 2013) found that REM was 442 
effective in verifying total catches in a trial with 15 English vessels. While some skippers in this study 443 
stated that having cameras on board was the only approach that would ensure compliance, others 444 
had reservations and were fearful that UK-vessel operators would be disadvantaged relative to those 445 
from other countries. Placing more emphasis on the business benefits of accurately recording 446 
catches to improve management and therefore fishing opportunities, should be part of a strategy to 447 
implement the LO. 448 
 449 
Fourth, the problem of quota inflexibility must be resolved: In agreement with previous studies, 450 
quota restrictions are a key driver of discards (Catchpole, 2012; Condie et al., 2014a; STECF, 2014; 451 
García et al., 2016; Poseidon, 2013), and quota inflexibility is a serious risk to implementing the LO. 452 
To avoid substantial adverse economic impacts, it will be important to eliminate the so-called ‘choke 453 
species’ problem (NSAC, 2013; STECF, 2014; McIlwain, 2015). Quotas are shared between EU 454 
countries, whereby for each stock a different fixed percentage allocation per EU country is applied, 455 
known as the relative stability key. EU countries can exchange quotas, and the distribution of quotas  456 
at the national level  is determined by each EU country. The highest risk of a choke occurs when a 457 
nation receives a low relative stability share of a species and the discard rate of that species  in that 458 
nation’s fisheries, is higher than the average for that stock. Continued and increased national and 459 
international movement of quota will be an essential tool to off-set these disparities and enable 460 
continued fishing in these cases. As part of the reformed CFP there is provision under Article 15, 461 
paragraphs 4a and 4b, for inter-annual and inter-species quota flexibility subject to strict conditions. 462 
It is recommended that work be done with actors who manage quota, such as the UK Producer 463 
Organisations, and fisheries managers to identify mechanisms that will ensure the highest levels of 464 
flexibility in quota usage both internationally and domestically. 465 
 466 
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Fifth, dealing with the unwanted catch at sea and on land raises several logistical issues.  Dealing 467 
with the unwanted catch at sea will be difficult. For example, the CFP agreement means that 468 
undersized fish must be stowed separately from fish over the minimum conservation reference size 469 
although not sorted by species. However, separate species’ weights do have to be recorded, which 470 
will increase the time needed to sort the catch, either on the vessel or ashore. Participating skippers 471 
noted that the LO may affect fishing operations and health and safety implications making it 472 
necessary to modify the layout, sorting processes and storage areas on board vessels. 473 
 474 
Issues were also highlighted with landing the additional material, in terms of additional transport, 475 
space requirements and refrigeration. Finally, a key observation from the trial was the resource 476 
required to organise and monitor the collection and delivery of the otherwise discarded material. Of 477 
course, many of these problems, such as the additional sorting, the challenges in handling and 478 
storing material both on the vessel and at the point of landing, will discourage vessel operators from 479 
catching and landing unwanted material, which is precisely the aim of the LO.  480 
 481 
Sixth, a cultural shift in attitude and mind-set is required to make the landing obligation work: It has 482 
been noted that the LO will require behavioural and institutional change, not only from the fishing 483 
sector but from fisheries managers, control authorities and fisheries scientists (NSAC, 2013). As 484 
Johnsen and Eliasen (2011) point out, “in the end the success of the system depends on the fishers’ 485 
willingness to comply”, which in turn depends on “how legitimate and rational the fishers regard the 486 
system to be”, and whether they are prepared to undergo a cultural shift in attitude and mind-set. 487 
One cultural attitude that needs changing is the reluctance of some fishers to make use of selective 488 
gears. While historically, the risks of losing marketable catches when using more selective designs 489 
may have dissuaded fishers, this must now also be viewed in the context of lost fishing opportunities 490 
if quota becomes exhausted and the ability to convert previously discarded catches into quota for 491 
marketable fish. By altering catch compositions through changes in selectivity it is possible to reduce 492 
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catches of small, low value size classes and the most restrictive species to increase profits from 493 
available quota. Gullestad et al (2015) reported that the experience of Norway was that the discard 494 
ban itself brought about the change in fishers’ behaviour needed to make it work. 495 
 496 
A second cultural shift needed is for fishers and fishery managers not to exploit as loopholes the 497 
various exemptions provided by the European Commission, such as the de minimis concession. 498 
STECF (2013) drew attention to the subjective nature of the criteria within the de minimis rules - 499 
disproportionate costs and difficulty of selectivity - warning that used irresponsibly, the de minimis 500 
rule could lead to overexploitation above MSY, either when de minimis levels are set too high or if 501 
they are not monitored and exceed the agreed levels. 502 
 503 
A third cultural shift that must occur is the ending of hostility by port authorities to landings of 504 
unwanted catches. Market managers wanted to improve the quality of fish and did not want low 505 
value fish on the market. This reluctance will need to change, but it will only do so when managers 506 
see that there is a value associated with unwanted fish and that there are potential opportunities for 507 
new business with this material. There is evidence that more positive attitudes are emerging (de 508 
Rozarieux, 2015).  509 
 510 
5. Conclusion and recommendations  511 
This study has conducted a discard ban trial in English waters to simulate the implementation of the 512 
landing obligation which was introduced under the new EU Common Fisheries Policy. The main 513 
finding of the study is that while the LO is a very challenging requirement for the fishing industry to 514 
meet, there are steps that can be taken to minimise the risk to fishers and maximise that chance of a 515 
successful implementation of the LO, provided the following five recommendations are adopted.  516 
 517 
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1. Work should be conducted to ensure that the safety of fishers is not compromised by the LO. In 518 
particular, the effect on vessel stability, additional trip hazards on deck and sorting injuries for 519 
crew, should be assessed and guidance to vessel operators provided.  520 
2. Catch data should be analysed in real-time from vessel reporting systems, markets, and 521 
independent observations so that catch rates and quota availability can be monitored allowing 522 
fishing businesses to plan their activities. Specifically, robust testing of the catch recording (e-523 
log) system should be conducted so skippers have the tools to record their full catch. For 524 
sections of the fleet where log books are not required, work should be undertaken to determine 525 
how new self-reporting tools, independent at-sea observations, on shore monitoring and sales 526 
data can be integrated to deliver full documentation of catches.  527 
3. Work should be done with POs and fisheries managers to identify mechanisms that will ensure 528 
the highest levels of flexibility in quota usage, both internationally and domestically.  529 
4. Preparations should be made for the likelihood that more small, but legally-sized, fish will be put 530 
on to the human consumption market, and that more  storage and transport facilities will be 531 
needed for material destined for non-human consumption  at ports. 532 
5. Efforts must be made to change mind-sets which are currently hostile to the LO through 533 
stronger links between stakeholder groups and fishery managers as part of the regionalised EU 534 
fisheries management process, to ensure that the industry has knowledge of all available tools 535 
to help them successfully transition to the LO. 536 
537 
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